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Until recently, the social-technical process of invention has fallen between 
sociological investigation of the genesis of a new idea (an ideational 
phenomenon) and the production of a new technology (a material phenomenon).  
The advent of post-modernism and post-structuralism offered new avenues for 
theorising invention, accounting for, on the one hand, its material nature, and, on 
the other, its ideational nature, through the notion of socio-technical ensembles: 
phenomena constructed through the co-producing, mutually constitutive action of 
actants (both human and otherwise).  This paper argues that despite its potential, 
theorising within the sociology of science and technology is hampered by 
insufficient attention to the role of the researcher and the concept and practice of 
reflexivity.  Reflexive practices within this field of knowledge are explored, and 
drawing on an empirical case study of an antibiotic preparation, a case is made 
for the necessity of reflexivity in the production of knowledge about invention.  
Key Words: Science, Technology, Reflexivity, and Sociology 
 
Studies of science, technology, and the innovation process have enabled 
significant developments to be made in our understanding of the process of invention.  
Various disciplines, including sociology and philosophy, have offered theoretical tools 
for the examination of the intellectual endeavours and technological accomplishments of 
humankind, and in the process, thrown into relief some of the many difficulties inherent 
in the historiography of science and technology.  Notable here would be, for example, 
efforts to comprehend the possibility of producing valid knowledge despite the 
researcher’s enmeshment within the social context of which they are themselves a 
creation (e.g., Mannheim, 1960, pp. 71, 264); or the extent to which it may be possible 
for conclusions to be drawn that might be other than a mere reflection of the researcher’s 
position within the social structure (Bourdieu, 1994).  Yet the compilation of detailed 
sociological knowledge about the processes of invention has been severely restricted over 
the past century by disciplinary boundaries and sub-field distinctions.  These issues, 
which are discussed at length in the first section of the paper, have resulted in a 
fragmented field of knowledge with insufficient emphasis on the role of the sociological 
researcher.  This individual is entrusted with the task of “discovering” past achievements 
and the “assemblage” of the historical case study - a tool widely used for organising and 
presenting information about the scientific past - so that they may add to disciplinary 
knowledge about invention: yet the researcher remains an invisible component in any 
conventional accounting of an invention.  Despite the centrality of the sociological 
researcher to the development of sociological knowledge about the mechanisms of the 
invention process, critical questions about the researcher’s role remain unasked: How are 
unknown aspects of the past “made known” by the researcher? What enables a researcher 
to locate “missing” voices, events or achievements? To what extent can a researcher 
“reveal” the historical junctures and pathways of a technology? 
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The work of the sociological researcher in producing knowledge about the science 
and technology process is yet to be fully studied or theorised.  In order to begin this 
process, this paper examines the nature of reflexivity in the invention process.  
Reflexivity is essentially concerned with questions about how an individual might come 
to produce an account of an aspect of reality (Fuller, 1995b, p. 161).  An argument is 
made that studies of invention have primarily conceived reflexivity in moral and 
philosophical, rather than methodological and epistemological terms, thus obscuring the 
much more critical role of reflexivity in the research process.  Employing an empirical 
case study of the invention of “Eryc” - an antibiotic product - this paper demonstrates the 
critical impact of the sociologist, arguing that reflexivity is an essential component of the 
production of knowledge about the invention process.  A new concept - primary 
analytical reflexivity - is proposed as a means to fully comprehend the missing element in 
the process through which a researcher can be acknowledged to have taken a legitimate 
place in the social (or socio-technical) construction of an invention, as well as in the 
production of historiographical accounts of the past.  
 
Previous Developments and the State of the Field 
 
“Invention” has for some time been a problematic concept, given that it may refer, 
in common discourse, to the creation of either ideational or material products.  For 
several decades during the latter half of the 20th century, the study of invention fell, 
rather awkwardly, between two fields of research.  One field, that of innovation, 
technological change, and the social impact of technology, focused on the “material” 
nature of invention; while the other, the investigation of the world of science, intellectual 
production, and the laboratory, examined the ideational aspect of invention.  The first 
field of knowledge became popular during the 1970s, and, when applied to medicine, 
either focused on the introduction of technologies to the market and their adoption by 
doctors, hospitals and clinics (e.g., Greer, 1985; McKinlay, 1981); or the social impact of 
an innovation (e.g., Bates & Lapsley, 1985; Faden & Kass, 1993).  These studies of 
technology generally placed little emphasis on the processes which preceded the 
“promising report” or media announcement of a “scientific breakthrough” (McKinlay), 
and gave more attention to the diffusion process, where doctors and hospitals “adopted” 
technologies which were presumably invented elsewhere (e.g., Evans, 1993; Martin, 
1993; Pasveer, 1989).  Despite the value of these approaches for revealing the social 
problems of new technologies, there was a growing recognition within sociology of the 
need to move beyond an essentialist conception of technology, and consider how 
technologies themselves might embody social values (e.g., Harding, 1991; Raymond, 
1979; Woodward, 1970, p. 14).  
The second body of knowledge encompasses a rather diverse field, and includes 
the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, the Sociology of Science, Laboratory Studies, as 
well as sociological offerings from the History and Philosophy of Science.  Increasingly 
prevalent from the mid 1960s, these studies systematically investigated science as a realm 
of social activity and a form of organisation (e.g., Barnes, 1977; Bloor, 1975; Mulkay, 
1979; Traweek, 1988; Whitley, 1982).  Eschewing the commercial and industrial 
orientation evident in the Innovation studies approach (e.g., Abernathy & Utterback, 
1978), and the essentialism of the technology studies perspective, these dealt with 
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“invention” in terms of “conceptualisation”, theorising the creation of “mental products” 
as a social process shaped by social relations and social context.  Although no consensus 
was reached within these fields over theoretical frameworks, program objectives or 
identifiable boundaries for a sub-discipline; they stood as an alternative to biological or 
psychological theories of creativity, where inventors were believed to have an “inherent 
propensity” toward creative behaviour (cf. Bienaymé, 1986, p. 139; Collyer, 1997, p. 
195-196).  Often, but not consistently ethnographic in method, scholars produced insights 
into the day-to-day processes of scientific practice through a focus on “unfinished 
knowledge” or knowledge “that is yet in the process of being constituted” (Knorr-Cetina, 
1995, p. 141).  Here too was a growing recognition of the paucity of current theories; in 
this case, in dealing adequately with the material world (e.g., Barnes, p. 25-26; Bury, 
1986; Woolgar, 1987).  The persisting lacuna in this theoretical field constituted a 
particular problem for invention, for this phenomena has the capacity to take the form of 
an idea, concept, theory, technique, “tacit” knowledge, formula, device or machine, and 
so traverses the many possibilities between the ideational and material worlds. 
Theoretical developments in both fields came with the diffusion of post-
modernism and post-structuralism.  Mirroring developments in other fields of sociology 
such as gender, sexuality and health, where the perishable, suffering, corporeal, embodied 
individual began to be taken into account (e.g., Harraway, 1991; Turner, 1984); the 
sociological study of science and technology answered with an array of conceptual 
frameworks and programs.  Though there have been many attempts to delineate the 
boundaries between their fields, formulate unique identities, and offer coherent principles 
for future research; there has been a blurring between philosophical, historical and 
sociological approaches (cf. Shapin, 1995, p. 289), and between theoretical and 
epistemological frameworks.  Thus many of the same authors (such as Callon, Collins, 
Fox Keller, Knorr-Cetina, Latour, Law, Mulkay, Pinch, and Woolgar), their works, and 
conceptual frameworks, are claimed equally by several sub-fields or program areas (as 
found in, for example, Fuller, 1995a; Jasanoff, 2000; Jasanoff, Markle, Petersen, & 
Pinch, 1995; Pinch, 1993).  While no consensus has been, or is likely to be reached on 
how this diverse field might be identified, and though it may be useful to distinguish 
between them for other purposes, there is no necessity in this paper to do so.  Instead the 
term “the sociology of science/technology” will suffice to refer to this rather 
heterogeneous body of literature, which shares little more than a commitment to 
sociologically explaining either the social or the socio-technical basis of science and/or 
technology.  
One recent approach within this literature is the actor-network theory of Callon, 
Law and Latour, where the “technical” and “the social” are defined only in relation to one 
another, as a “seamless web”, and not as an interaction between two distinct ontological 
phenomena (cf. Callon, 1986; Hughes, 1986; Latour, 1987, 1991, p. 129).  For the first 
time since the birth of the modern sociological project with Parsons’ 1937 Structure of 
Social Action, and the subsequent exclusion of biology and the physical environment 
from legitimate sociological inquiry; “the social” lost its favoured status (cf. Collyer, 
2010).  In this new framework, material elements were conceived not as passive aspects 
of reality, but “participants” in “social ordering” (Callon & Law, 1997, p. 167).  This 
opened a theoretical “space” for invention, for it was argued that technologies and 
humans interact upon one another, and in the process, elements are created, modified and 
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transformed.  Thus the inventor and the invented are co-produced in a translation process 
(Knorr-Cetina, 1995, pp. 145-146; also Latour, 1991, p. 116).  
The emergence of actor-network theory has also re-invigorated theoretical 
development regarding social constructionism.  The origins of the constructionist 
perspective are integral to the origins of sociology itself, for its principles were formed in 
historic debates over the identity and nature of the emerging discipline.  Though Marx, 
Weber, and Durkheim are not constructionists according to modern usage of the term, 
their work is suggestive of its later principles.  For example, Weber proposed knowledge 
to be a body of value-ideas constructed “in the mind” through a subjective process 
directed by the value-orientation of the researcher (1949, pp. 80, 94), but given 
objectivity (i.e., shared meaning) by its production within social interaction (1968, p. 
519).  Similarly, both Marx and Durkheim theorised ideas and knowledge as reflecting, 
respectively, the social structure and social organisation of society.  These, along with 
more recent contributions from sociologists such as Alfred Schutz and Pierre Bourdieu, 
offered a perspective in which knowledge and reality are products of society, and “facts” 
are historically located and collectively produced. 
The constructivist perspective is often targeted for its relativistic stance, for it has 
traditionally proposed “reality” as not external to social life, but embedded within and 
(largely or wholly) determined by it.  As a consequence, knowledge of the world is 
“constructed” rather than directly “captured” or “discovered” in the process of 
“knowing”; and a product of subjective cognition.  The development of actor-network 
theory, in repositioning the concept of “the social”, has re-problematised the notion of 
“the real”, spawning debate over realism versus idealism, and objectivity versus 
subjectivity, and, perhaps coincidentally, a range of new philosophical and sociological 
positions, including “subtle realism” (Hammersley, 1992) and “critical” or “reflexive” 
realism (Layder, 1998; Porter, 1993).  There have been many critiques of actor-network 
theory, despite its popularity and wide application in fields as diverse as computers and 
information systems, education, management and development studies.  This theoretical 
framework has also been vigorously defended (e.g., Callon, 1998; Callon & Law, 1997; 
Latour, 1994; Law, 1992).  Critiques have focused on its masculinist, Machiavellian and 
Hobbesian interpretations of human nature; its characterisation of the actor as a self-
seeking entity intent on building networks, prestige and power (e.g., Martin, 1998; 
Shapin, 1995); its inadequate theorisation of power and social structure (e.g., Collyer, 
1997; Kleinman, 1998); and the propensity toward colonisation hidden with its liberal-
democratic plea for the liberation of the machine (Lee & Brown 1994).  However few 
concerns have been voiced over the epistemological and methodological implications of 
actor-network theory. 
Actor-network theory does not merely replace social constructionism with socio-
technical constructionism, but re-configures the relationships between the “knower”, the 
production of knowledge, and the “known”.  Within the sociology of knowledge, these 
relationships are captured with the methodological principle of reflexivity, which enables 
the researcher to produce authentic knowledge even though they are enmeshed within the 
world they study.  Reflexive practices include self-reflection on the part of the researcher 
upon their presence, and provide the means to assess the extent and nature of social 
influences on the research process.  The notion of “reflexivity” can be traced back to 
Weber and Schutz with their ideas of philosophical self-reflection and the search for 
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hidden influences on one’s work.  Though the concept has a variety of meanings in the 
social sciences (cf. Lynch, 2000, pp. 27-34), and been challenged by the post-modernist 
and post-structuralist notion of a plurality of meanings and forms of knowing; scholars 
generally retain the core idea of the researcher as required to “provide an account of 
social reality that can explain how the theorist could come to have such an account” 
(Fuller, 1995b, p. 161). 
Given the considerable overlap between the sociology of knowledge and the 
sociology of science/technology (for both are concerned with the analysis of the nature of 
knowledge itself), and the recent status of reflexivity as a moral imperative and means for 
social scientists to access both resources and status (cf. Lynch, 2000; Maton, 2003, p. 
54); it is somewhat surprising to find the latter body of literature lacking in reflexive 
practices.  Yet this has been a sustained criticism within the sociology of 
science/technology (e.g., Fuller, 1995b; Woolgar, 1991; Woolgar & Ashmore, 1988, p. 
2).  The next section demonstrates how reflexivity has, and has not, been addressed in a 
sample of studies from the sociology of science/technology.  It indicates that these 
criticisms are at least partially true, for there are some aspects of reflexivity, particularly 
the “core” principle outlined above, which receive insufficient attention in practice.  
 
Reflexivity in the Sociology of Science/Technology 
 
One of the more significant features of post-modernity for theorists such as 
Foucault, Derrida, Bauman, Beck, Giddens and Lash, is its reflexivity.  As Bauman 
(1991, p. 272) argues, “Postmodernity is modernity coming to terms with its own 
impossibility; a self-monitoring modernity, one that consciously discards what it was 
once unconsciously doing”.  For scholars working within the field of the sociology of 
science/technology, reflexivity has not been a significant issue of debate, but nevertheless 
appears on the agenda (e.g., Bloor, 1976, Collins, 1990; Fuller, 1995b; Woolgar, 1991).  
This has arisen in part, because of a broader epistemological shift since the 1960s across 
the social sciences and the arts, with a rejection of positivist and idealised images of the 
natural sciences, redefined notions of objectivity and value-neutrality, and challenges to 
expertise and authority.  Yet it appears there is a measure of truth in complaints about the 
lack of reflexivity in the sociology of science/technology, for closer analysis indicates 
only a limited form of reflexivity is practiced in this field. 
In her analysis of sociological approaches to the research process, Stanley (1996) 
discerns two forms of reflexivity, descriptive and analytical.  The first, arising as a term 
in the 1960s in feminist critiques of research methodology and the Sociology of Scientific 
Knowledge, refers to the influences on the researcher from the social context (including 
the relations of power), and of the social interaction between researcher and the subjects 
of the research.  This form of reflexivity has been taken up with some vigour by 
sociologists generally, and, despite complaints to the contrary, can also be found within 
the sociology of science/technology.  For example, the studies by Måhlck (2001), Cohen, 
McAuley, and Duberley (2001), and Roth and Bowen (2001), demonstrate how 
knowledge, or the processes of knowledge production, are shaped by social context or 
social structures of power.  Similarly, Blume’s (2000) study of the cochlear implant 
reflects at length on how the author’s values and interests (as a sociologist and father of 
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two deaf children), influence the research process, his interaction with participants, and 
his views and knowledge of the technology. 
The second form of reflexivity, analytical reflexivity (Stanley, 1996), is 
apparently more difficult to accomplish and rarely found.  Analytical reflexivity involves 
an explanation of the processes through which the researcher reaches an understanding of 
the phenomena; that is, how they “construct” their knowledge claims.  This second form 
of reflexivity appears to be the concern of Fuller (1995b, p. 161), for in making a case for 
a widespread lack of reflexivity, points to the works of Lash, Beck and Giddens, arguing 
that none of the theorists discuss how they came to understand reflexive modernity itself: 
a crucial issue given they are themselves products of the uncertainties of which they 
speak.  This raises the question of how a researcher might be uniquely capable of 
obtaining knowledge from which others are barred.  This is the conundrum which some 
other theorists, such as Bourdieu, seek to resolve. 
Bourdieu (1994) theorises how a form of knowledge can be produced which is 
more than the partial, positioned view of the individual scholar, and equally more than 
the sum of multiple, individual viewpoints.  In other words, how the structured, collective 
nature of science might enable the production of a form of knowledge which escapes the 
confines of the apparently inevitable positionality of the individual producers of 
knowledge.  For Bourdieu, the escape from the “gravitational effects” of a researcher’s 
intellectual field can be transcended through a process of epistemic reflexivity (Bourdieu, 
1994; Maton, 2003, p. 57).  
According to Bourdieu (1994), the researcher or “knower” enters into an 
objectifying relationship with the “object” of knowledge in the production of knowledge, 
and engagement with epistemic reflexivity means “making the objectifying relation itself 
the object of analysis” (Maton, 2003, p. 57).  This procedure is not individualised but a 
collective practice, for it comprises not just the self-fascinated, individual’s values, 
interests and commitments, but a structured enterprise of the scientific field as a whole 
(cf. Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 72).  Epistemic reflexivity thus differs from 
descriptive reflexivity (that is, the form of reflexivity generally carried out by 
sociologists), because rather than a focus on the relationship between the researcher (or 
knower) and knowledge, it focuses on the relations between the researcher and the object 
of knowledge (cf. Maton).  However Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, though 
insightful, does not offer a means to operationalise epistemic reflexivity as a collective, 
rather than individual research strategy (Maton, p. 58), and moreover, tends to create a 
boundary between the knower and the object of knowledge which verges on positivism: a 
boundary which other sociologists are inclined to render more permeable or indeed even 
abandon. 
An alternative to Bourdieu’s framework is provided by Weber.  Though far less 
recent, Weber’s books, including The Methodology of the Social Sciences, remain 
incomparable for their attention to the form of reflexivity under discussion here.  In 
Weber’s theory of knowledge, the process of knowledge production involves the scholar 
as a historically located actor whose actions are social and thus oriented toward meaning.  
This means knowledge is never created in the abstract, but an outcome of social 
processes (Weber, 1968).  During knowledge production, the scholar comes to “know” 
about reality through a subjective process of evaluating the “infinite empirical context” 
and constructing a view, theory or perspective according to their value-orientation 
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(Weber, 1949, p. 78).  The value-orientation of the scholar directs them toward what is 
culturally significant, narrowing the field and enabling the actor to “make sense” of the 
empirical context (Zaret, 1980, p. 1183).  This social process has both subjective and 
objective dimensions.  It is subjective because it is always an evaluation.  “Every 
meaningful value-judgement about someone else’s aspirations must be a criticism from 
the standpoint of one’s own Weltanschauung; it must be a struggle against another’s 
ideals from the standpoint of one’s own” (Weber, 1949, p. 60).  On the other hand, 
historical analysis is not subjective, meanings are shared, and not “valid” only for each 
individual (Weber, 1949, pp. 83-84).  “Objectivity”, according to Weber (1949, p. 60), is 
not where an analysis “captures reality” through value-neutrality, for an “attitude of 
moral indifference has no connection with scientific ‘objectivity’”.  Instead, the process 
of knowledge production can be objective because the scholar obtains a sense of cultural 
significance from prevailing evaluative ideas (Weber, 1949, pp. 83-84), disciplinary 
knowledges, and their own experience and analytical training (1949, pp. 79-80).  
In this subjective/objective process, knowledge is not “discovered” but a product 
of human reason (Månson, 2000, p. 79; Weber, 1949, p. 106).  The empirical “objects of 
analysis”, that is, “facts” or “the known”, are not given, but “constructed” by the social 
actor (Zaret, 1980, p. 1183), for “we comprehend reality only through a chain of 
intellectual modifications” (Weber, 1949, pp. 80, 94).  In other words, we do not merely 
“select” which aspect of reality to study, or how to understand a given phenomenon, but 
“construct” that phenomenon, for “there is nothing in the things themselves to set some 
of them apart as alone meriting attention” (Weber, 1949, p. 78).  
Reflexivity occurs for Weber when the scholar reflects upon what Bourdieu later 
described as the objectifying relations between the researcher and the object of 
knowledge (Bourdieu, 1994; Maton, 2003).  Most scholars, Weber claims, conflate the 
abstract categories and concepts they use to produce knowledge with reality itself, and 
forget these are merely tools to understand reality (1949, p. 85; also 1964, pp. 140-145).  
This principle differentiates Weber’s analyses from those of many other scholars, because 
he remains cognisant of the distinction between an “ideal type” (a “mental construction”, 
see 1949, pp. 101-103), and the “intrinsic” nature of reality; for he argues the former is 
always partial, distorted, and logically extreme (1949, pp. 72-73, 170-172; also Kalberg, 
1997, p. 222).  Weber’s distinction between mental constructions and empirical reality is 
the basis of analytical reflexivity, for in practice this requires reflection upon the process 
through which the scholar produces the object of knowledge.  It is this form of reflexivity 
which enables the collective, structured practice of scholars to escape the “gravitational” 
effects of positionality. 
In the sociology of science/technology, two examples of analytical reflexivity can 
be provided.  Both represent case studies of controversies in science/technology which 
examine the processes through which researchers construct their arguments.  Turner 
(2001, pp. 477, 499) argues for the need to apply critical reflexivity to ensure an 
awareness of how an author’s own narrative choices “dictate the political and moral 
arguments implicit in each account ... [and] ... determine the way in which particular 
accounts of technoscientific controversies work, and what they ultimately mean”.  For 
Rees (2001), the main topic of discussion is the methodological practice of observation in 
a case study of infanticide among primates.  Nevertheless Rees includes an insightful, if 
brief, discussion about how the field workers presented their arguments to form 
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coherence, what evidence they focused on (and importantly, what they ignored), and how 
they offered different interpretations, even with access to the same observational reports.  
For Rees (2001, p. 523), differences emerged because researchers “filtered” “facts” 
according to “relevance”.  Although these two examples display analytical reflexivity, 
their focus is the practice of other researchers: not of the author.  Thus they represent 
examples of what we might term secondary analytical reflexivity.  
Examples of primary analytical reflexivity are more difficult to locate, for this 
requires the researcher to apply the principles of analytical reflexivity to their own work.  
There is little within the field of sociology of science/technology to compare with the 
efforts of Weber’s (1930) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.  In the 
book’s introduction, and also elsewhere (e.g., Weber, 1949, p. 71), Weber insists that 
despite its value as an exploration of the ideational foundation of capitalism, it offers an 
incomplete analysis of historical change.  In other words, it disregards the multiplicity of 
causal forces in order to offer an “antidote” to prevailing materialist analyses.  With the 
exception of Weber’s book, there is a paucity of primary analytical reflexivity in many 
literatures. In the sociology of science/technology, this is particularly problematic when 
investigating the nature of invention. The next two sections will outline the method of the 
case study research, and then go on to demonstrate how Weber’s notion of reflexivity can 
be applied in a case study of an invention.  The case for reflexivity will be made not just 
on moral grounds, but as a means to better comprehend the phenomena which is the 
object of study: the invention of technology. 
 
A Case Study of an Invention 
 
Personal statement.  This paper draws on a piece of empirical research 
conducted while a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology at Flinders University 
of South Australia in the early 1990s.  My interest in the subject of invention had been 
stimulated in the years prior to my candidature, when working as a researcher in a 
consultancy firm attached to Wollongong University, the centre for Technology And 
Social Change (TASC).  Clients for the centre came from both government and industry.  
Much of our research focussed on the impact of new technologies on social relationships 
and institutions (e.g., predicting the need for a re-skilling of the workforce if new banking 
or engineering technologies were to be introduced).  Although working at the centre gave 
me the opportunity to utilise, and hone, my qualitative and quantitative skills, and 
certainly enhanced my project management skills, the clients of the centre were 
predominantly “Right Wing”, “Dry” or “Neo-liberal” in orientation; and the provision of 
research and consultancy services in this atmosphere became increasingly unsatisfactory 
for an idealistic and essentially “Left-Wing” sociologist.  Having been granted a 
scholarship for further study, I “escaped” happily to academia where I was less 
constrained by politics and the iron bands of bureaucracy.  I spent the next three years as 
a post-graduate student exploring the social construction of technologies, free to critically 
theorise and question all aspects of the invention and innovation process, including the 
client’s motives, the policy context, and the influence of the researcher’s values and 
political beliefs.  After completing the PhD I spent some years employed on short-term 
academic contracts, and in 1999 was appointed to the University of Sydney.  Although 
the research from which this paper has been drawn was completed some years ago, these 
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reflections are very recently composed.  In one sense, this paper reflects what I was 
attempting to write in my thesis, but at that time I had insufficient command of the 
theoretical and conceptual literature to express such complex thoughts.  It was only after 
re-reading Weber, and coming to a more mature appreciation of his reflections on the 
nature of history and historiography (cf. Collyer, 2008), that the central ideas of this 
paper could be articulated.  In essence, these ideas have been in a “development phase” 
for the past two decades. 
 
The study.  The subject of the case study is the invention of “Eryc”, an antibiotic 
product on the international market.  The case study results from data gathered from 20 
in-depth, semi-structured interviews with key-informants.  Participants cover a broad 
range of interests, occupations and perspectives; including government officials, industry 
representatives (marketing, sales, scientists, management), university scientists, 
researchers, medical practitioners, and members of medical organisations such as the 
Pharmacy Guild and the Australian Society of Hospital Pharmacists.  Potential 
interviewees were identified through a “snow-balling” method, and the interviews, which 
were conducted in Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney and Canberra, were between one and 
four hours duration.  All were tape-recorded and transcribed with permission of the 
participants.  At the time of the interviews, the university did not require sociologists to 
seek permission from an institutional ethics committee for non-invasive, non-clinical, 
social research.  Nevertheless, the researcher adhered to the ethical guidelines of The 
Australian Sociological Association, which can be found at www.tasa.org.au/ethical-
guidelines/ 
 
“Constructing” or “Discovering” an Invention 
 
In the Innovation literature, the process through which a researcher finds a subject 
for study is rarely problematised, as technologies are perceived as ontological entities 
defined by market “success”.  While there are “failed” inventions, these are merely 
“scientific breakthroughs” which did not fully develop into technological products, or 
products which did not survive the market process: either as a consequence of 
inadequacies within the product itself, the structure of the market (cf. Abernathy & 
Utterback, 1978), or a lack of powerful sponsorship (cf. McKinlay, 1981).  The sociology 
of science/technology literature similarly offers little in the way of reflection on the role 
of the researcher and the methods used to produce an account of the birth of an idea or 
technology (cf. Shapin, 1995).  Generally speaking, authors do not reflect on how they 
“selected” a subject for the case study, but begin with their “object of analysis”, and 
proceed to examine its “history”, and the cultural, political, economic and/or technical 
factors which shaped the technology’s trajectory over time (e.g., Drake & Purvis, 2001).  
Studies focusing on “originating ideas” and the context of science, rather than 
technologies per se, are equally culpable in their lack of primary analytical reflexivity.  
These locate the focus of their research through a process similar to that used in the study 
of a technology, for scientific activity is considered in many ways to parallel the 
processes of the broader market.  Within scientific networks, “unfinished knowledge” 
(Knorr-Cetina, 1995, p. 141), and “mere opinion”, become new knowledge through 
formal and informal competitive structures.  These structures force scientists to “say 
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something new”, connect people and organisations, and actively “push” discoveries 
through, “selling” new ideas and techniques to others (Fuchs, 1993).  Compared with the 
Innovation literature, a more critical approach is taken toward the subject matter, for 
“discoveries” are not ontologically given entities which remain unchanged as they 
become innovations, but modified by the various agendas and interests of the scientists.  
Hence their final form may be quite different from the original (Brannigan, 1981).  
Nevertheless, the researcher is able to unproblematically obtain a focus for their study by 
examining, for example, the contents of newspapers for evidence of a “scientific 
controversy”, or the scientific journals to locate “breakthroughs” which have excited the 
interest of scientists and attracted resources.  As such, this process is little different from 
the innovation researcher who might “select” a successful technology from an 
examination of stock market reports.  In both cases, a “history” of a product or idea 
appears to be based on an abstract, rational process of “history writing”; and working 
backward from the present “success”, “controversy” or “breakthrough”, to a possible 
originating context. 
The actor-network approach differs somewhat from this format.  Here the focus of 
a case study is not the “invention” or “breakthrough” itself, but the network of which it is 
part.  Thus the invention is not theorised as an “entity”, that is, a distinct object with well-
established boundaries, but a “compound reality” and set of relations (Callon & Law, 
1997).  Nevertheless, the process through which these “breakthroughs” and innovations 
become the subject of the research (and thus come to constitute “knowledge” of the 
invention), is not problematised.  Researchers produce all forms of knowledge through 
calibration, measurement and theorising (cf. Latour, 1987, p. 256), but the “critical 
judgement” of the researcher, though necessary to the research process (cf. Bijker, 1993), 
is not given specific attention.  Instead, the notion of a privileged “outside observer” is 
rejected as an “epistemological myth” (cf. Latour, 1998).  There is therefore, little 
acknowledgement that the “selection” of a focus for examination is itself a process of 
knowledge building: of producing knowledge about knowledge.  Amidst the amorphous 
relations of the actor-network, the researcher, seeking to describe and explain its 
formation, is not accorded particular significance. 
However it can be suggested that the historical and social location of the 
researcher is of central importance, not just to the relationship between the “knower” and 
the “knowledge” they construct, but also to the relations between the “knower” and the 
object of knowledge.  Over recent decades, studies within the sociology of knowledge 
have drawn attention to the inherently social basis of knowledge production, revealing an 
unequal and hierarchical structure within which core, Western countries dominate 
(Connell & Wood, 2002).  Within this system, case studies of “major breakthroughs”, 
“scientific controversies”, and “new technological trajectories”, focus on events 
considered significant to members of the core nations, while other developments are less 
likely to be documented.  A researcher located in either the periphery or semi-periphery 
(to borrow Wallerstein’s terms), is constantly made aware of this facet of knowledge 
production, and hence ideally positioned to question what may be standard practice 
elsewhere (though not ideally positioned to successfully challenge the status quo).  
Moreover, in a country where its own developments are usually over-looked by the core 
research community, a researcher is rarely in a position to “select” an object for analysis 
from an existing reservoir of ideas already documented by other social actors.  In other 
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words, while researchers in core countries are busy revising their histories, in the 
periphery these “histories” are relatively less complete, and a more complex process of 
construction is required.  Despite its disadvantages, the general lack of scholarly 
knowledge about the past in peripheral, or semi-peripheral countries, represents an ideal 
context in which to explore how an object of analysis is constructed for historical 
analysis, and can be used to demonstrate reflexivity as a pre-requisite for the production 
of knowledge.  
Self-reflection on the researcher’s motivation and interests might be regarded 
merely as a form of narcissism, where the researcher usurps the object of study in a form 
of confessional autobiography (cf. Maton, 2003, pp. 55-56).  However such self-
reflection gives way to primary analytical reflexivity where an opportunity appears to 
escape the “gravitational effects” of one’s intellectual field.  The case of “Eryc” offers an 
example of this, for the semi-peripheral location produced a determination in the 
researcher to “find” an Australian pharmaceutical invention to demonstrate the relevance 
of Australian science and contribute to the literature.  Important also was discipline-based 
knowledge about the state of the Australian pharmaceutical industry, which, despite the 
support of governments during the 1970s and 80s through the construction of state-owned 
companies (such as CSL and Fawnmac), and research and development tax assistance 
programs (such as the Factor F scheme), did not survive subsequent privatisations and 
budget cuts.  By the 1990s the industry had returned to its dependence on foreign imports 
and was once again dominated by the subsidiaries of transnational or international firms 
(Kot & Petit-Young, 1990, p. 407; PMSC, 1991, pp. 3-7). 
Such knowledge of the industry sector provided not an impediment, but an 
impetus to the search for an “invention” which might “lie in waiting” for a curious 
researcher.  While Australia’s position on the semi-periphery of the global economy and 
its internal political, cultural and economic structure means that it has only 0.7% of the 
share in patent families and is a net importer of technologies such as licences, patents and 
technical assistance (OECD, 2000, pp. 52, 54); the output of Australian scientists 
(measured by the publication of papers) is on a par with countries such as the United 
States (measured relative to population) (OECD, p. 51).  In other words, although 
Australian’s rarely maintain ownership of their “inventions”, they are relatively 
successful in creating them.  Such knowledge only encouraged the researcher's 
determination to “find” an Australian pharmaceutical invention and demonstrate the 
relevance of Australian scientists to the history of science and technology. 
Documentary searches and preliminary discussions with members of the medical 
and scientific communities unearthed little of interest.  Driven by a sense of nationalism, 
and perhaps reformist zeal in the face of perceived global injustice, the researcher 
persisted with the belief that Australian scientists must have been successful at least once, 
and was spurred into further action (as scientists are when they scent the possibility of 
“making a discovery”), when it became increasingly obvious that if there had been any 
inventions, these had not yet been included in the historical record.  Eventually a retired 
scientist suggested an approach to F.H. Faulding, one of the few Australian-based 
companies (and the only one focusing on pharmaceuticals rather than over-the-counter 
products).  With little conviction in his voice, the scientist stated: “if anyone has come up 
with something, it would be within Faulding”.  
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Initial inquiries at Faulding failed to produce a candidate for research.  At first 
this appeared to be a problem of language, for the words “invention”, “breakthrough”, 
“new technology”, and “innovation” suggest events of “world changing” magnitude.  
Given this connotation, participants could not envisage a connection between historic 
change and the mundane tasks of their daily work environment.  Though the terms do not 
preclude the idea of an invention as merely a modification of an existing idea or process, 
or new ways of drawing on existing ideas or techniques; they are more often assumed to 
refer to a radical departure from established knowledge and practice.  As one participant 
suggested, the word technology does not invoke the idea of something that could have 
been achieved 25 years previously with the same instruments or materials: 
 
When I think of ... [new technologies in medicine] I think of banks of instruments, 
computers, catheters, wonderful wiring and information, transplants, endoscopic 
surgery, micro-surgery perhaps ... that sort of thing.  That is what I call 
technology.  (Doctor, Interview 7) 
 
The researcher, well-versed in theories of science and technology, encouraged 
participants to consider technology in terms of modifications and the borrowing of ideas 
and established practices from outside the firm itself.  Participants began to discuss 
technology in these terms and consider whether there may have been some past events 
within the firm which influenced medical practice or enabled Faulding to offer a new 
product or process for the market.  Discussion focused on the history of the firm, which 
had been started by Francis Hardy Faulding in May 1845, and had, over the intervening 
decades, operated essentially as a warehouse for the importation of both medicinal and 
non-medicinal products, limiting its manufacturing activities to products which were 
either generic, or based on licences from overseas companies.  Several participants 
suggested that at some stage, Faulding had ended its “warehousing” role and become 
active in research and the development of its own pharmaceutical products.  This 
produced some consideration of which product may have been the first of the new era. 
Eventually one of Faulding’s staff brought up the case of erythromycin, an 
antibiotic which had been, rather fondly, given the name of “Eryc”.  Discussion amongst 
participants focused on whether it was accurate to call this an “invention”, and what 
might have been new about Eryc.  It was quickly agreed that the active antibiotic 
substance from which Eryc is made is not the “new” component.  Erythromycin products 
had been available on the market in a variety of forms since the 1950s, and indeed 
Faulding was, in the 1960s, producing erythromycin stearate under licence to Abbott 
(meaning that Abbott owned the patent), and selling this product as “Ethryn” on the 
Australian market.  Dismissed also was the idea of Eryc as “new” and “unique” because 
of the enteric coating process used to protect the drug’s active ingredient, or even the 
substance applied in the coating process.  The coating substance had previously been 
approved for such use by government authorities, and the practice of coating active 
ingredients was becoming common as a drug delivery system at the time of the Eryc 
development (cf. Illum & Davis, 1987).  Further, the company had previously used the 
coating method for an earlier product - Prodopa - which was released for hospital use in 
1972.  Staff also dismissed the idea that Eryc was “new” because the active ingredient 
had been formed into tiny round pellets and evenly coated with a polymer, weighed and 
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placed inside a gelatine capsule.  This process too had been used in the past.  It was 
eventually agreed that the “new” element of Eryc was the idea of combining the three 
processes with the antibiotic erythromycin.  
A focus on the value-orientation of the socially-located actors provides additional 
insights into how the construction of Eryc as an “invention”, was shaped by interaction 
with the staff of Faulding.  Although initial communication faltered over the definition of 
such terms as “invention”, “technology”, “new”, and “breakthrough”, it eventually 
became apparent there was more to the problem than language, for these were not 
universal nor value-neutral concepts but context-specific and value-laden.  How an actor 
understands an event or phenomenon from the past will depend on the actor’s social and 
historical location.  In medicine for example, clinical practitioners are particularly 
disinclined to label their work as “new”, for this may give the impression techniques are 
experimental, untested or unsafe.  This pragmatic conservatism among practitioners was 
in evidence in this study, when one participant stated:  
 
As far as a GP is concerned, even with the new drugs that are released by 
the government or even those subsidised by the government, there is an 
old saying, “Don't be the first doctor to try a new drug nor the last.”  
(Interview 2)  
 
Researchers in a research environment, on the contrary, have a stronger incentive 
to label their work “new”, and may even exaggerate differences between existing and 
previous practices or products (Collyer, 1994a); while researchers in a commercial 
environment are inclined to consider technologies to be “inventions” only where they 
offer direct commercial potential and can attract copyright or patent protection.  
Moreover, in one social context, minor changes may be considered innovatory, whereas 
in another, constant change may be the “norm”.  For example, surgeons working within 
the speciality of plastic surgery often find themselves facing unique and unusual 
problems.  Plastic surgeons contend they must constantly improvise and “make up 
operations to suit circumstances” (Collyer, 1994b).  Surgeons are thus likely to consider 
their work an extension of medical practice rather than an invention.  In some other areas 
of medicine even minor modifications from standard practice are unusual (and likely to 
bring censure or litigation), and hence the construction of “new technologies” is a less 
frequent event.  Given this context-specific and value-laden nature of invention, a very 
different focus for the case study would have emerged if instead of seeking the assistance 
of research and marketing staff from Faulding, it had begun with participants from the 
medical community.  
The case of Eryc indicates that an object of analysis (such as an invention) is not 
“discovered” but “constructed”, and demonstrates how this might occur in an interactive 
process between social actors, where at least one of the actors is the researcher.  For the 
research to proceed, Eryc had to be “constructed” as a “social fact”, as it had not 
previously been granted the status of an “invention” in prevailing discourse (either 
informally or by an historian), and so had to be given salience through social action.  In 
the case of Eryc, “social action” included the interests and value-orientations of the 
researcher and the participants.  Analytical reflexivity indicates these were integral to the 
research process, for Eryc would not have been “discovered” without the introduction of 
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prevailing theories of science and technology to prompt actors to reflect on past 
experience in new terms.  This indicates the researcher was not a passive agent in the 
production of historical knowledge.  Analytical reflexivity also reveals Eryc was not an 
unproblematic, ontological, technical entity “waiting to be discovered”, but a socio-
technical construction birthed, in large part, during the research process itself.  
 
“Constructing” or “Discovering” the Inventor 
 
Progress with the building of the case study of Eryc met with further difficulties 
when it became time to identify the source of the invention.  It is not uncommon for the 
identity of the inventor to be disputed when the history of a technology or scientific 
breakthrough is being recounted.  This is no less true in the case of Eryc.  Company 
literature and many participants in this study identified the “inventors” of Eryc as Brian 
Davies (the Marketing Manager) and Michael Story (a development engineer).  However 
a small number pointed to Bernard Boggiano, an employee of the company, two pointed 
to individuals outside Faulding, such as Lloyd Sansom, Sidney Bell, or Peter McDonald, 
and one participant volunteered the name of the then Managing Director of Faulding, Bill 
Scammell.  The identity of many individuals who might also have taken some part in 
events during the 1960s and 70s, including Richard Handcock and Bill O'Reilly, appear 
to have largely disappeared from the historical record. 
In part, these diverse perspectives on the originator of Eryc, and the disappearance 
of some individuals from the historical record, can be understood as effects of the 
differing socio-historical locations of the participants in the study.  Engineers or 
marketing staff for example, were more interested in, and knowledgeable about past 
events and individuals with a bearing on their own profession.  As a result, these 
participants pointed to the importance of Davies and Story, who handled the process of 
production of the bulk product and the public announcement of Eryc as a “medical 
breakthrough” during the mid 1970s.  In contrast, members of the scientific and medical 
community remarked upon the roles of actors within their own fields: such as Bernard 
Boggiano (a research chemist), Don Sorrell (a microbiologist), Tom Hemmings (a 
research pharmacist), Michael Gleeson (a chemist), or Peter McDonald (a microbiologist 
who organised the clinical trial and steered the product through government registration 
procedures). 
However, the identification of a given individual as “the inventor” is also 
dependent on the intellectual tradition within which the researcher operates.  From an 
Innovation Studies perspective, an inventor is one who can be most closely associated 
with a marketable or patentable product.  Scientific theories or clinical problems 
connected with the product are of less importance, and merely provide context or 
“background”.  In the case of Eryc, the focus within this tradition would be on the events 
of the 1970s (when the product entered the market) and the roles of Story and Davies.  In 
contrast, this researcher took a sociology of science/technology approach, and therefore 
focused on historic events prior to the development of a market product.  There are, as 
Mulkay (1979, p. 74) suggests, advantages in concentrating on the stages before an 
intellectual consensus is reached, when knowledge of the empirical world becomes 
solidified and difficult to conceive in any other form.  From inside this tradition, 
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individuals such as Boggiano and Gleeson, and events of the 1960s become critical 
elements of the historical narrative. 
Once the data has been gathered, the next phase for the researcher is to assemble a 
case study or “history”.  From a sociology of science/technology perspective, the 
conventional approach is to identify a group of individuals who can be closely associated 
with a “scientific breakthrough”, new theory, or innovation; and evaluate their relative 
contributions.  The temporal ordering of events, ideas and actions become an important 
tool for the researcher in this process.  An understanding of the competitive context of 
science is also of assistance, as it is generally agreed that recognition and reward are not 
based on merit alone (cf. Clarke & Montini, 1993; Goldberg, 1988).  As a result, the 
researcher generally seeks to critically assess the various contributions, aware of the 
possibility that not all contributers will have been publicly acknowledged.  A case study 
may then be produced, placing the central figures, ideas and events within a social 
context in order to explain the social forces determining or shaping the scientific or 
technological trajectory.  The first draft of a case study of Eryc proceeded according to 
this standard formula, and is briefly narrated below. 
 
The Invention of Eryc 
 
During the 1960s, a number of medical and scientific workers became interested 
in the problems with the clinical use of erythromycin: a common and readily available 
antibiotic.  Articles in clinical and pharmaceutical journals at the time suggested the 
absorption of erythromycin into the blood of the patient was extremely low and erratic 
(e.g., Goodwin, 1967).  Even after being given high doses of the drug it was sometimes 
up to 12 hours before patients could benefit from the medication.  Given that the drug 
was administered for the control of infection, the lack of predicability of the dosage was 
considered a serious problem, as patients might be left without medication for extended 
periods during which no supplementary medication could be given.  The popular 
explanation for low and erratic absorption was that erythromycin was destroyed by the 
body’s own protective mechanisms in the blood.  
By the mid 1960s, reports were appearing in The Lancet and other 
medical/scientific journals about another product, Levodopa, suggesting its active 
ingredient was being destroyed by the acidic environment of the stomach.  Boggiano, as 
Product Manager at Faulding, considered whether the reports about Levodopa might be 
applicable to erythromycin:  
 
I began to get ideas of what was wrong with erythromycin stearate ... little 
dawnings of ideas began to come out between Don Sorrell, myself, and 
Tom Hemmings ... that perhaps erythromycin stearate wasn’t all that it 
was made out to be.  (Boggiano, Interview 9) 
  
Boggiano believed the solution to this problem might lead to a new antibiotic 
product.  Leading a small team, Boggiano started work in 1968 on a new erythromycin 
stearate product which would have an enteric coating to protect the active ingredient 
against gastric acids.  Ethryn Cota-Tabs was launched in 1970.  This was not heralded as 
a “breakthrough”, for there was, at this stage, no scientific proof the coated product was 
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more efficacious, nor sufficient evidence to disprove claims by the rival company 
(manufacturing the leading brand of erythromycin), that the uncoated product was self-
protective against gastric acids.  Spurred on by colleagues such as pharmacokeniticist 
Sidney Bell (an expert on the bodily absorption, distribution, metabolism and excretion of 
drugs) from the School of Pharmacy at the Institute of Technology; Boggiano and 
Gleeson set up an experiment in the early 1970s, to provide scientific proof of the 
destruction of erythromycin by gastric acids and evidence of the lack of therapeutic 
potential if given in the standard formulation.  The results were first presented at The 
Chemical Society meetings and company-sponsored gatherings, and it is alleged attempts 
were made at these events, and over subsequent months, to intimidate the pair into 
withholding the evidence.  Indeed, as a sales representative of a rival company suggested, 
they should not “kill the goose which laid the golden egg”.  Boggiano and Gleeson 
nevertheless wrote up the results of the study and submitted the paper for publication in 
1973.  Publication was unusually slow, perhaps because one of the key referees was an 
employee of a rival company; and it was another three years before the paper appeared in 
an academic journal (cf. Boggiano & Gleeson, 1976).  The case of Eryc is not unique in 
this regard.  Other scientists have reported similar problems, given that it is up to their 
peers - who are often also their competitors - to “approve” their work and allow it to be 
made public (e.g., Goldberg, 1988, pp. 56, 63).  Moreover, sociological studies of science 
have documented the misunderstandings and resentments which characterise scientific 
practice over the circulation or withholding of scientific information (cf. Mulkay, 1979, 
p. 71). 
During the early 1970s, efforts were also made to improve the Faulding product, 
Syndopa, which was not enteric coated.  Bill Scammell had spent most of 1968 in Europe 
and America and brought back many ideas for the improvement of existing drug products 
and new developments in equipment for pharmaceutical production.  He and Boggiano 
decided they could improve Syndopa by combining the idea of an enteric coating with a 
process of pelletisation.  Pelletisation had been thought for some time to be a means to 
improve the absorption of drugs.  Boggiano and others argued that the irregularity of the 
delivery of a drug into the blood system was the result of the action of the pyloric 
sphincter (a little valve which acts to prevent large particles from passing through the 
stomach into the intestine).  Tablets could be trapped in the stomach until they were 
broken into small pieces, a process which could take as long as 12 hours.  In some 
instances however, the tablets could escape through the valve by chance; in which case 
the active ingredient would have an immediate effect.  Pelletisation offered a possible 
solution, for tiny pellets were thought to be treated as a liquid by the body and able to 
travel at a predictable and constant rate through the pyloric sphincter.  In 1972, Faulding 
launched a new product, Levodopa, which was both coated and pelletised.  This product 
was produced only in small quantities for hospital use and not released onto the 
international market. 
Despite the coating of erythromycin in Ethryn Cota-Tabs, clinical experience 
continued to indicate problems with absorption of the antibiotic.  Between 1971 and 
1973, Boggiano and his team at Faulding, supported by company board member Bill 
Scammell, developed the idea of a new erythromycin product.  This time it would be both 
coated and pelletised, like Levodopa.  By the end of 1972, “Eryc” was starting to become 
more than an idea, and by 1973 Boggiano had a proto-type which he tested on himself 
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with the help of a neighbour and local general practitioner, Adrian Vanderborch.  
Engineer Michael Story was busy in 1973 solving the problems of the production 
process, for the firm’s existing pelletisation equipment was not suitable for bulk 
manufacturing.  A small trial of Eryc occurred in 1974 after the finalisation of the 
formulation (this time on Boggiano and his biochemist colleague Bob Braybrook), and a 
more systematic clinical trial was led in 1975 by Peter McDonald (McDonald, Mather, & 
Story, 1977) on staff at the Flinders Medical Centre: a hospital recently constructed and 
fully staffed but yet to be opened to patients.  Eryc was finally launched in Australia in 
1977. 
 
Analytical Reflexivity and the Case of Eryc 
 
This account of the “history” of Eryc centres around the historical “moment” in 
which a scientist or scientists experience a “gestalt” switch; where a solution to a problem 
appears solvable by applying concepts or experiences from another sphere of activity (cf. 
Mulkay, 1979, p. 105).  It emphasises the collective nature of science; the necessity for 
sustained informal contacts with other scientists (cf. Collins & Harrison, 1975), and the 
medical community, in order for new knowledge and technologies to be produced.  It also 
demonstrates how new products may be developed as a response, not to scientific “proof” 
(for this may come later, if at all), but to the “construction” of a socio-clinical problem 
and a building awareness of a possible industrial “solution”.  A partial “consensus” about 
a problem with the absorption and acid destruction of the drug was reached within the 
scientific and medical communities prior to the provision of conclusive “proof”, and in 
the face of contradictory evidence: a not entirely unique event, as Gilbert (1976) shows in 
his study of radars.  It also reveals the historical indeterminacy of a technology; for a very 
different product may have resulted if, for example, Boggiano and Gleeson had agreed to 
protect the short term interests of the pharmaceutical industry by failing to disclose their 
findings on erythromycin efficacy; if Scammell and Boggiano had not convinced other 
members of the board to support the further development of erythromycin; or if changes 
in the state-financed Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) had not, in 1971, enhanced 
the possibility of profit from an improved, future erythromycin product.  
The above account identifies Boggiano as an inventor of the idea upon which the 
new product was based, and differs little from many other case studies within the 
sociology of science/technology tradition.  Like these others, however, it fails to 
incorporate analytical reflexivity, and hence uncritically reproduces an historical 
narrative of heroic “discovery” which took place without the intervention of the 
researcher.  Consequently, as we shall see, the socio-technical construction of Eryc has 
only partly been told. 
The application of primary analytical reflexivity to the case of Eryc reveals the 
researcher’s significant role in the identification of Boggiano as the “inventor”.  
Admittedly, the extent to which a particular researcher can contribute to the 
“construction” of the inventor will vary in practice.  In most case studies, researchers do 
not “construct” the inventor, for they do not challenge existing accounts, but merely 
reiterate past claims about the identity of a given inventor from previous studies or 
reports (e.g., Hong, 1998).  Unless the research is specifically about a case of “mistaken 
identity”, further research on this matter is not considered important to the problem at 
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hand.  In a case such as Eryc however, where the identity of the inventor was previously 
unknown (or known to only a small number of individuals), the researcher bears greater 
individual responsibility for “constructing” the inventor per se, for in producing a case 
study or “history”, knowledge is being “created” as well as legitimised and transmitted 
into the future.  
Further insights are produced with the application of analytical reflexivity.  We 
can note for example, that the focus of this study, like others in the sociology of 
science/technology, is on a defined sphere of social, or socio-technical action, and largely 
excludes the contributions of those external to the scientific community.  This is because, 
for the most part, the sociology of science/technology presumes, rather than 
problematises, the boundaries between “science” and “non-science”.  Although scientific 
activity is acknowledged to be collective (cf. Shapin, 1995), analysis is usually restricted 
to a narrow sphere of action regarded as “scientific work”, and little thought is given to 
how this activity is conducted within a much larger, hierarchically-organised production 
system in which the relative value and reward for various tasks, skills, roles, and status 
positions are differentiated and determined.  Most accounts do not explore the hidden 
assumptions which guide the granting of significance to specific kinds of actions and 
individuals in particular roles.  The resulting case studies merely reproduce the 
hierarchical context of science, contribute to the prevailing belief in science as a distinct 
and highly valuable arena of social action, and fail to problematise its relations of power 
and prestige.  As a consequence, the convention is to prioritise the contribution of “the 
inventor”, Boggiano, over that of Scammell, the laboratory assistant, the individuals who 
made the test tubes, answered the telephones, or provided security services.  Although it 
might well be useful and legitimate for an individual researcher to focus exclusively on a 
specific sphere of social action as an analytical exercise (as Weber did in The Protestant 
Ethic), the sociology of science/technology could only benefit from problematising the 
prevailing assumptions of the field; including the distinction between “science” and 
“non-science”, and the very Western-centred, individualised, liberal-democratic 
conception of the inventor, which celebrates an individual contribution and prioritises 
“scientific contributions” over others.  
The application of primary analytical reflexivity would, moreover, be a valuable 
exercise in the sociology of science/technology, because it reveals the theoretical “logic” 
behind the narrative.  The case study of Eryc, for example, is shown to employ a 
presentist approach to history.  Presentism means that individuals, events or 
phenomenon, considered significant in the present context, are traced to an origin point in 
the past, and a small selection of elements from the empirical past are ordered into a 
coherent narrative to explain its trajectory.  The presentist approach to history has been 
criticised as an artificially constructed mythology in which imputed social actions and 
causal relationships did not, in fact, take place (cf. Jones, 1974; Seidman, 1985, p. 14; 
Skinner, 1969).  Most sociology of science/technology accounts are presentist because 
they take the technology or new idea from the present, and trace an historical pathway in 
which objects or ideas are passed (and perhaps transformed) between actors or sites of 
interaction over time.  Yet the selection of a “point of origin”, as well as the object of 
analysis, are relatively arbitrary.  Just as a standard “family tree” restricts the 
identification of an individual’s forebears to the male line, leaves out illegitimate liaisons 
and offspring, and so disregards half the genetic “history” (and almost all evidence of 
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social history); a presentist “history” is highly selective and distorted.  In the case study 
of Eryc, the author of the account might have focused their gaze elsewhere, and found, 
for example, the “origin” of Eryc in the first articulation of a theory of the operation of 
the pyloric sphincter, the development of the first antibiotic, or even the formation of the 
PBS.  Yet the limitations of this approach to the past are rarely discussed in this literature, 
and few scholars appear aware of their assumption that there is an historical pathway and 
an historical “root” which can be “traced” and “located” by the researcher. 
The conventional alternative to presentism, is to view the past as characterised by 
disjuncture and disruption, with each idea, event or technology historically located and 
created anew in an historical “moment”.  This is the historicist conception of history, 
where the historian seeks to place events, individuals and ideas in their historical context, 
and to “understand the past, completely as possible, in its own terms” (Jones, 1974, p. 
355).  In the historicist approach to history, knowledge is pertinent only to a particular 
problem and intention (Skinner, 1969, p. 50) and is therefore always “new” (Seidman, 
1983, p. 85).  From an historicist perspective, it is not legitimate to trace the history of a 
particular idea (Camic, 1997, p. 6): nor indeed the history of a technology or scientific 
controversy.  Hence the historicist approach is rarely found in the sociology of 
science/technology. 
Actor-network theory offers a variation on the conventional, presentist, sociology 
of science/technology approach to historical case studies.  Rather than focus on the 
technology as it appears over time, there is an attempt to over-come distinctions between 
object and context, actant and background, and past and present, by defining the essence 
of an innovation in the totality of the innovation network (cf. Latour, 1991, p. 115).  The 
focus on the whole rather than its parts, takes into account the way in which all elements 
within the network are co-produced and transformed over time, such that at the 
“temporary” end to the story, none of the original actants can be found (Latour, 1991, p. 
117).  This enables a problematisation of the concept of invention, for in the invention of 
the Kodak camera, Latour argues the invention may be the camera, but it might equally 
be the creation of the patent system, the development in paper processing, or even the 
emergence of a mass market for amateur photography.  In this approach, rather than 
explaining an innovation’s historical path retrospectively, an empiricist, historicist 
approach is assumed, and the researcher takes what an actor does to an innovation to 
define the actors (cf. Latour, 1991, p. 121).  Also consistent with an historicist approach 
is the rejection of the necessity of the researcher’s intervention to ascertain causality and 
explain socio-technical change.  For the historicist, authenticity can be found in the 
integrity of the text itself (Jones, 1974, p. 355).  Similarly, for Latour, no “third party” or 
“external” point of view is essential, for an innovation is explained by “triangulating the 
many points of view of the actors” (Latour, 1991, p. 124).  Admittedly, the researcher has 
a role in weighing up the importance of each element within the case study (Latour, 1991, 
p. 116), but it is the examination of the actions of the actor with regard to the innovation 
that allows the “cause” of the innovation to be found (Latour, 1991, p. 121).  
Weber’s approach to history offers a compromise between the presentist approach 
of conventional sociologies of science/technology, and the historicism of actor-network 
theory.  Although most historians perceive the actors from the past to be central to our 
understanding of the past, Weber’s theoretical schema proposes two sets of actors which 
must be taken into account.  These are the actors from the past who were significant in 
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the creation and transmission of new ideas (or technologies), but also a second set of 
actors, who in the present context “make sense” of the past by “constructing” these past 
acts and events as “social facts”.  Both sets of actors are socially and historically located 
(cf: Weber 1968), and orient their actions to that which is meaningful (cf. Weber, 1949, 
p. 78).  Weber’s theories can be readily coupled with the notion of a primary analytical 
reflexive researcher, who, in constructing a case study and producing a “history”, is a 
significant social actor in the co-production of an invention and an inventor.  Added to 
the concept of the analytical, reflexive researcher however, must be Weber’s theory of 
history, for he argues the past cannot be adequately understood either retrospectively, as 
it is in the presentist approach to history, by constructing the past according to present 
definitions and concerns; nor can it be assumed, as it is in historicism, that the “facts” of 
the case study will in themselves explain the trajectory of an idea (or technology) and 
thus historical change.  Weber’s proposition is that our understanding of the past will 
come from combining both empirical study and theoretical reasoning with the critical 
reflection of the historian.  The latter, which has been discussed in this paper under the 
notion of primary analytical reflexivity, is the process through which the historian reflects 
on how they have constructed socio-historical facts from empirical reality and social 
theory, and, importantly, how they use these social facts to explain the past.  
Extrapolating from Weber’s theories of knowledge and history, it can be proposed 
that standard case studies from the sociology of science/technology and the translation 
network approach, are, in effect, “ideal types” illustrating unique patterns of social or 
socio-technical action in a given historical context (cf. Weber, 1949, pp. 101-103).  The 
reflexive researcher will neither conflate these with the empirical world, nor assume the 
analysis is complete once the “historical sketch” has been drafted.  For Weber (1949:101-
3), the construction of an ideal type is an essential first step in analysis, but is always 
partial and distorted; does not capture the “intrinsic” nature of reality (Kalberg, 1997, p. 
222; Weber, 1949, pp. 72-73); and is unable to provide the means to demonstrate 
causality (Kalberg, 1997, pp. 222-223; Weber, 1949, p. 102).  Understanding causality 
for Weber is the second step in analysis, within which the ideal type can serve only as a 
reference point.  In other words, while Latour and the historicists seek causality within 
the bounded arena of action described in the case study, and the sociologists of 
science/technology find it within the internal dynamic of science or the social context; for 
Weber (1968, p. 29), historical change is produced through a multiplicity of social forces, 




The case of Eryc has demonstrated the critical role of the researcher in the 
construction of a history of an invention, and how reflection on this process is the tool 
sociology provides for taking scholars one small step beyond the positionality of 
perspective.  While sociology has, for the past century, increasingly provided room for 
reflection on the relationship between the “knower” and the production of “knowledge”, 
Weber’s theories of knowledge and of history re-focus our attention on the socio-
historical construction of the “object of knowledge” and the “objectifying relations” 
which also shape our perceptions.  The application of Weber’s theories in this field 
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indicate that reflection on this process is critical to escaping the “gravitational pull” of 
conventional sociological analysis.  
Recent sociology of science/technology approaches to invention indicate the 
complex interweaving of social and technological phenomena, but have yet to incorporate 
primary analytical reflexivity into their case studies or theoretical schema.  While the 
concepts of co-production, mutual constitution and the translation process resolve many 
previous limitations, there is a need to acknowledge the researcher as equally an actant in 
the co-production of social and technological change.  Without primary analytical 
reflexivity, which necessitates an awareness of the researcher’s subjective-objective 
“choices”, the historical trajectory of an innovation, its constituent elements, and the 
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